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Revisiting the Mannesmann Takeover: How Markets for Corporate Control Emerge

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Höpner,  Martin
Institutioneller Wandel im gegenwärtigen Kapitalismus, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society;

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Jackson,  Gregory
Regimewettbewerb und Integration in den industriellen Beziehungen, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society;

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Citation

Höpner, M., & Jackson, G. (2006). Revisiting the Mannesmann Takeover: How Markets for Corporate Control Emerge. European Management Review, 3(3), 142-155. doi:10.1057/palgrave.emr.1500061.


Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0012-4C3A-9
Abstract
Degrees of shareholder orientation among companies differ across countries as well as over time. Markets for corporate control are important elements of corporate governance regimes that affect such orientations. German corporate governance has often been described as a bank-oriented, blockholder, or stakeholder model where markets for corporate control play no significant role. This case study of the hostile takeover of Mannesmann AG by Vodafone in 2000 demonstrates how systemic changes during the 1990s have eroded past institutional barriers to takeovers. The emergence of a market for corporate control cannot be understood by looking at takeover regulation in isolation. Rather, takeover markets rely on a whole set of complementary institutions, social practices, and predominant interpretations, such as banking strategies, codetermination practices, company regulation, and business ideologies. A limited, but significant segment of German corporations are now subjected to a market for corporate control.