La debolezza dello stato da risorsa a vincolo: Il corporativismo dello stato 
sociale e l’uso privato del pubblico interesse

Streeck, Wolfgang

doi:10.1425/13103

Datensatz

DATENSATZ AKTIONENEXPORT

Zur Ablage hinzufügen

Lokale TagsFreigabegeschichteDetailsÜbersicht

Freigegeben

Zeitschriftenartikel

La debolezza dello stato da risorsa a vincolo: Il corporativismo dello stato sociale e l’uso privato del pubblico interesse

MPG-Autoren

/persons/resource/persons41304

Streeck, Wolfgang
Regimewettbewerb und Integration in den industriellen Beziehungen, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society;

Externe Ressourcen

http://www.rivisteweb.it/doi/10.1425/13103
(Zusammenfassung)

http://dx.doi.org/10.1425/13103
(Verlagsversion)

Volltexte (beschränkter Zugriff)

Für Ihren IP-Bereich sind aktuell keine Volltexte freigegeben.

Volltexte (frei zugänglich)

SM_70_2004_Streeck.pdf
(beliebiger Volltext), 2MB

Ergänzendes Material (frei zugänglich)

Es sind keine frei zugänglichen Ergänzenden Materialien verfügbar

Zitation

Streeck, W. (2004). La debolezza dello stato da risorsa a vincolo: Il corporativismo dello stato sociale e l’uso privato del pubblico interesse. Stato e Mercato, (70), 3-36. doi:10.1425/13103.

Zitierlink: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0012-506D-7

Zusammenfassung

The paper is a contribution to a book edited by, "Semisovereignty Revisited: Governance, Institutions and Policies in United Germany". The book will appear in 2003 or 2004. It explores to what extent Peter Katzenstein's seminal study of the "semi-sovereign" German state in the 1980s is still valid. The paper looks at one of the showpieces of Katzenstein's theory of beneficial semisovereignty, German industrial relations, and follows their development from the "Modell Deutschland" of the 1976 election campaign to "Schröder's Bündnis für Arbeit". It comes to the conclusion that as far as Germany is concerned, the days are gone when it was an advantage for the governance of industrial relations to have a weak state.