Promises and Pitfalls of Veto Player Analysis

Ganghof, Steffen

doi:10.1002/j.1662-6370.2003.tb00411.x

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Promises and Pitfalls of Veto Player Analysis

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Ganghof, Steffen
Politik und politische Ökonomie, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society;

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https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1662-6370.2003.tb00411.x
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Zitation

Ganghof, S. (2003). Promises and Pitfalls of Veto Player Analysis. Swiss Political Science Review, 9(2), 1-25. doi:10.1002/j.1662-6370.2003.tb00411.x.

Zitierlink: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0012-5160-A

Zusammenfassung

Veto player approaches have come to occupy a central role in comparative politics. This article critically reviews the literature, focussing especially on veto player explanations of policy outputs and outcomes. The review highlights three problems empirical veto player studies have to face: 1) identifying the relevant veto players, 2) establishing equivalence between veto players, and 3) specifying (theoretically or empirically) veto players' policy preferences. The article concludes that empirical veto player analyses advance our understanding of political institutions and their effects, but that they should deal more systematically with the three above mentioned problems.