Zusammenfassung
Discuter à propos d’une constitution européenne nécessite de se confronter à d’importants défis politiques qui ne se rencontrent pas réellement dans le cadre institutionnel actuel de l’Union européenne. Le présent article présente tout d’abord trois modes de gouvernement communautaire distincts : les négociations intergouvernementales, la centralisation supranationale et les décisions conjointes. Dans ces trois modes de gouvernement, l’action européenne appliquée et légitime dépend d’un haut degré de consensus entre les membres des gouvernements des États. L’article examine ensuite les conditions des réponses européennes aux trois nouveaux défis politiques : l’élargissement à l’Est, la politique communautaire extérieure et de sécurité ainsi que la protection des États providence européens face à l’impact de l’intégration économique et de la libéralisation du marché. Dans chaque cas, on peut voir que les conflits d’intérêt significatifs entre les membres des gouvernements empêchent toute action dans le cadre institutionnel actuel. Prétendant que ces conflits ne peuvent pas être résolus par une évolution vers des institutions à régime majoritaire, l’article conclut en proposant différentes réponses politiques qui permettraient l’action communautaire dans le cadre d’une diversité légitime.
Discussions about a European constitution ought to focus on substantive policy challenges that cannot be met effectively within the present institutional framework of the European Union. The paper begins by discussing the characteristics of three distinct modes of European policy making – intergovernmental agreement, supranational centralization and joint-decision making. In all three modes, effective and legitimate European action depends on high levels of substantive consensus among member state governments. The paper goes on to examine the requirements of effective European responses to three novel policy challenges – Eastern enlargement, common foreign and security policy and the protection of European welfare states against the impact of economic integration and liberalization. In each case, it can be shown that politically salient conflicts of interest among member governments will prevent effective action within the present institutional framework. Arguing that these conflicts could not be legitimately settled by a move toward majoritarian institutions, the paper concludes with a discussion of differentiated policy responses that would allow European action in the face of legitimate diversity.
Legitimate diversity : the new challenge of european integration Discussions about a European constitution ought to focus on substantive policy challenges that cannot be met effectively within the present institutional framework of the European Union. The paper begins by discussing the characteristics of three distinct modes of European policy making — intergovernmental agreement, supranational centralization and joint-decision making. In all three modes, effective and legitimate European action depends on high levels of substantive consensus among member state governments. The paper goes on to examine the requirements of effective European responses to three novel policy challenges — Eastern enlargement, common foreign and security policy and the protection of European welfare states against the impact of economic integration and liberalization. In each case, it can be shown that politically salient conflicts of interest among member governments will prevent effective action within the present institutional framework. Arguing that these conflicts could not be legitimately settled by a move toward majoritarian institutions, the paper concludes with a discussion of differentiated policy responses that would allow European action in the face of legitimate diversity.
