Institutional Aspects of Standardization: Jurisdictional Conflicts and the 
Choice of Standardization Organizations

Werle, Raymund

doi:10.1080/13501760110056031

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Institutional Aspects of Standardization: Jurisdictional Conflicts and the Choice of Standardization Organizations

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Werle, Raymund
Wissenschaft, Technik und Innovationssysteme, MPI for the Study of Societies, Max Planck Society;

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501760110056031
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Citation

Werle, R. (2001). Institutional Aspects of Standardization: Jurisdictional Conflicts and the Choice of Standardization Organizations. Journal of European Public Policy, 8(3), 392-410. doi:10.1080/13501760110056031.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0012-5413-4

Abstract

Standardization organizations in the area of information and telecommunications technology have mushroomed in the last twodecades. In addition to new official organizations at the regional level, many private consortiums and forums have been set up that complement and compete with the incumbent national and international organizations. The organizational landscape and the relations between the standardization organizations are examined, and institutional reasons that could explain why the frequency and intensity of jurisdictional conflicts have remained low are considered. Institutional features not only frame a standardization organization's behavior toward other organizations, they also account for speed, exclusiveness, costs and market acceptance of standardization and thus influence firms' decisions about which organization to turn to with a standards issue. Although designed to promote collaboration between firms which usually compete, institutional rules do not guarantee a smooth internal standardization process if the economic gains at stake are high.