Can Strategic Uncertainty Help Deter Tax Evasion? - An Experiment on Auditing 
Rules

Tan, Fangfang; Yim, Andrew

doi:10.1016/j.joep.2012.11.005

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Can Strategic Uncertainty Help Deter Tax Evasion? - An Experiment on Auditing Rules

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Tan, Fangfang
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1977420
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Tan, F., & Yim, A. (2014). Can Strategic Uncertainty Help Deter Tax Evasion? - An Experiment on Auditing Rules. Journal of Economic Psychology, 40, 161-174. doi:10.1016/j.joep.2012.11.005.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000F-46AF-1

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