Unilateral Action and Negotiations About Climate Policy

Konrad, Kai A.; Thum, Marcel P.

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Unilateral Action and Negotiations About Climate Policy

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Konrad, Kai A.
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1971638
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引用

Konrad, K. A., & Thum, M. P. (2011). Unilateral Action and Negotiations About Climate Policy. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, 2011-19.

引用: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000F-46B9-9

要旨

We analyze bargaining over international climate agreements in a setting with incomplete information about abatement costs. Unilateral commitment to high abatement reduces the gains from global cooperation. This reduces the probability of reaching efficient international environmental agreements.