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Aspects of Fighting in Alliances

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Konrad,  Kai A.
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

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Citation

Konrad, K. A. (2011). Aspects of Fighting in Alliances. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, 2011-09.


Cite as: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000F-47B9-1
Abstract
This paper surveys some of the strategic aspects that emerge if players fight in an alliance against an enemy. The survey includes the free-rider problem and the hold-up problem that emerges in the baseline model, the role of supermodularity in alliance members’ effort contributions, the role of budget constraints, the role of information transfer inside the alliance, and the role of in-group favoritism.