Aspects of Fighting in Alliances

Konrad, Kai A.

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT

Add to Basket

Local TagsRelease HistoryDetailsSummary

Released

Paper

Aspects of Fighting in Alliances

MPS-Authors

/persons/resource/persons51208

Konrad, Kai A.
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

External Resource

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1934765
(Preprint)

Fulltext (restricted access)

There are currently no full texts shared for your IP range.

Fulltext (public)

There are no public fulltexts stored in PuRe

Supplementary Material (public)

There is no public supplementary material available

Citation

Konrad, K. A. (2011). Aspects of Fighting in Alliances. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, 2011-09.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000F-47B9-1

Abstract

This paper surveys some of the strategic aspects that emerge if players fight in an alliance against an enemy. The survey includes the free-rider problem and the hold-up problem that emerges in the baseline model, the role of supermodularity in alliance members’ effort contributions, the role of budget constraints, the role of information transfer inside the alliance, and the role of in-group favoritism.