Evolutionarily Stable In-Group Favoritism and Out-Group Spite in Intergroup 
Conflict

Konrad, Kai A.; Morath, Florian

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Evolutionarily Stable In-Group Favoritism and Out-Group Spite in Intergroup Conflict

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Konrad, Kai A.
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

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Morath, Florian
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

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http://ssrn.com/abstract=1881550
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Konrad, K. A., & Morath, F. (2011). Evolutionarily Stable In-Group Favoritism and Out-Group Spite in Intergroup Conflict. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, 2011-07.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000F-47C3-7

Abstract

We study conflict between two groups of individuals. Using Schaffer's (1988) concept of evolutionary stability we provide an evolutionary underpinning for in-group altruism combined with spiteful behavior towards members of the rival out-group. We characterize the set of evolutionarily stable combinations of in-group favoritism and out-group spite and find that an increase in in-group altruism can be balanced by a decrease in spiteful behavior towards the out-group.