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Bargaining Over Tax Information Exchange

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Elsayyad,  May
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

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Citation

Elsayyad, M. (2012). Bargaining Over Tax Information Exchange. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, No. 2012-02.


Cite as: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000F-49F2-D
Abstract
This paper empirically studies recent treaty signings between tax havens and OECD countries as the outcome of a bargaining process over treaty form. Havens can decide not to sign an agreement, sign a tax information exchange agreement or a double taxation convention. We use a highly stylized bargaining model to develop testable hypotheses with regards to the type of agreement signed. We show that the main determinants of treaty signing is a haven's bargaining power and good governance. We show that it is easier to renegotiate an already existent treaty to include information exchange than to pressure countries with no existent agreement.