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A homoclinic route to asymptotic full cooperation in adaptive networks and its failure

MPG-Autoren
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Traulsen,  Arne
Research Group Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society;

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Zschaler_NJP_2009.pdf
(Verlagsversion), 976KB

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Zitation

Zschaler, G., Traulsen, A., & Gross, T. (2010). A homoclinic route to asymptotic full cooperation in adaptive networks and its failure. New Journal of Physics, 12: 093015. doi:10.1088/1367-2630/12/9/093015.


Zitierlink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000F-D45E-E
Zusammenfassung
We consider the evolutionary dynamics of a cooperative game on an adaptive network, where the strategies of agents (cooperation or defection)feed back on their local interaction topology. While mutual cooperation is the social optimum, unilateral defection yields a higher payoff and undermines the evolution of cooperation. Although no a priori advantage is given to cooperators, an intrinsic dynamical mechanism can lead asymptotically to a state of full cooperation. In finite systems, this state is characterized by long periods of strong cooperation interrupted by sudden episodes of predominant defection, suggesting a possible mechanism for the systemic failure of cooperation in realworld systems.