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Journal Article

Similarity-based cooperation and spatial segregation

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Traulsen, A., & Claussen, J. C. (2004). Similarity-based cooperation and spatial segregation. Physical review E, 70(4). doi:10.1103/PhysRevE.70.046128.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0010-1015-3
We analyze a cooperative game, where the cooperative act is not based on the previous behavior of the coplayer, but on the similarity between the players. This system has been studied in a mean-field description. recently [A. Traulsen and H. G. Schuster, Phys. Rev. E 68, 046129 (2003)]. Here, the spatial extension to a two-dimensional lattice is studied, where each player interacts with eight players in a Moore neighborhood. The system shows a strong segregation independent of parameters. The introduction of a local conversion mechanism towards tolerance allows for four-state cycles and the emergence of spiral waves in the spatial game. In the case of asymmetric costs of cooperation a rich variety of complex behavior is observed depending on both cooperation costs. Finally, we study the stabilization of a cooperative fixed point of a forecast rule in the symmetric game, which corresponds to cooperation across segregation borders. This fixed point becomes unstable for high cooperation costs, but can be stabilized by a linear feedback mechanism.