English
 
User Manual Privacy Policy Disclaimer Contact us
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT

Released

Journal Article

Differential ineffability and the senses

MPS-Authors
/persons/resource/persons116

Levinson,  Stephen C.
Language and Cognition Department, MPI for Psycholinguistics, Max Planck Society;
Radboud University Nijmegen;

/persons/resource/persons119

Majid,  Asifa
Language and Cognition Department, MPI for Psycholinguistics, Max Planck Society;
Radboud University Nijmegen;

Locator
There are no locators available
Fulltext (public)

levinson_majid_M_L_2014.pdf
(Publisher version), 530KB

Supplementary Material (public)
There is no public supplementary material available
Citation

Levinson, S. C., & Majid, A. (2014). Differential ineffability and the senses. Mind & Language, 29, 407-427. doi:10.1111/mila.12057.


Cite as: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0010-514E-E
Abstract
neffability, the degree to which percepts or concepts resist linguistic coding, is a fairly unexplored nook of cognitive science. Although philosophical preoccupations with qualia or nonconceptual content certainly touch upon the area, there has been little systematic thought and hardly any empirical work in recent years on the subject. We argue that ineffability is an important domain for the cognitive sciences. For examining differential ineffability across the senses may be able to tell us important things about how the mind works, how different modalities talk to one another, and how language does, or does not, interact with other mental faculties.