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Journal Article

Alliances in the Shadow of Conflict

MPS-Authors
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Ke,  Changxia
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

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Konrad,  Kai A.
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

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Morath,  Florian
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

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Citation

Ke, C., Konrad, K. A., & Morath, F. (2015). Alliances in the Shadow of Conflict. Economic Inquiry, 53(2), 854-871. doi:10.1111/ecin.12151.


Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-000E-95A5-B
Abstract
Victorious alliances often fi…ght about the spoils of war. We consider experimentally when members of victorious alliances accept a peaceful division of the spoils, and when they fi…ght against each other, and how the inability to commit to a peaceful division affects their effort contributions in their fi…ght against a common enemy. First, we …find that an asymmetric split of the prize induces a higher likelihood of internal fi…ght and, in turn, reduces the effort contributions in the …fight against a joint enemy. Second, non-binding declarations on how to divide the spoils in case of victory do not help to mitigate the hold-up problem.