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The Taxation of Bilateral Trade with Endogenous Information

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Morath,  Florian
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

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http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2361365
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Citation

Dang, T. V., & Morath, F. (2013). The Taxation of Bilateral Trade with Endogenous Information. Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, No. 2013-07.


Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0015-32A6-8
Abstract
This paper analyzes the effects of taxation on trade in a decentralized market. We show that a tax on profits and a transaction tax have opposite implications for information acquisition and trade in the canonical take-it-and-leave-it offer bargaining model. A (marginal) increase of a transaction tax can lead to more information production and lower the probability of efficient trade. In contrast, a (marginal) increase of a profit tax can reduce the incentive to produce information and increase the probability of efficient trade. The taxation of profits can be efficiency enhancing when information is endogenous, while it has no effect when private information is exogenous.