Fragmented property rights and incentives for R&D

Clark, Derek J.; Konrad, Kai A.

doi:dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1080.0873

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT

Add to Basket

Local TagsRelease HistoryDetailsSummary

Released

Journal Article

Fragmented property rights and incentives for R&D

MPS-Authors

There are no MPG-Authors in the publication available

External Resource

No external resources are shared

Fulltext (restricted access)

There are currently no full texts shared for your IP range.

Fulltext (public)

There are no public fulltexts stored in PuRe

Supplementary Material (public)

There is no public supplementary material available

Citation

Clark, D. J., & Konrad, K. A. (2008). Fragmented property rights and incentives for R&D. Management science, 54(5), 969-981. doi:dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1080.0873.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0023-D45A-2

Abstract

Where product innovation requires several complementary patents, fragmented property rights can limit firms' willingness to invest in R&D. We consider the research intensity in multiple simultaneous R&D contests and how it depends on whether firms already hold relevant patents as well as the availability of an option to invent around. A measure of technological uncertainty is also analyzed. The multiple patent product involves an important hold-up problem that can reduce the overall R&D effort. Invent-around options moderate this problem. We also analyze targeted equilibria in which the aim of R&D can be to hold up a rival.