English
 
User Manual Privacy Policy Disclaimer Contact us
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT

Released

Journal Article

Fragmented property rights and incentives for R&D

MPS-Authors
There are no MPG-Authors available
Locator
There are no locators available
Fulltext (public)
There are no public fulltexts available
Supplementary Material (public)
There is no public supplementary material available
Citation

Clark, D. J., & Konrad, K. A. (2008). Fragmented property rights and incentives for R&D. Management science, 54(5), 969-981. doi:dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1080.0873.


Cite as: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0023-D45A-2
Abstract
Where product innovation requires several complementary patents, fragmented property rights can limit firms' willingness to invest in R&D. We consider the research intensity in multiple simultaneous R&D contests and how it depends on whether firms already hold relevant patents as well as the availability of an option to invent around. A measure of technological uncertainty is also analyzed. The multiple patent product involves an important hold-up problem that can reduce the overall R&D effort. Invent-around options moderate this problem. We also analyze targeted equilibria in which the aim of R&D can be to hold up a rival.