Will we ever stop studying one-shot games? Fairness as an equilibrium selection 
device in an indefinite repeated bargaining experiment

Rieskamp, Jörg

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT

Add to Basket

Local TagsRelease HistoryDetailsSummary

Released

Conference Paper

Will we ever stop studying one-shot games? Fairness as an equilibrium selection device in an indefinite repeated bargaining experiment

MPS-Authors

/persons/resource/persons139738

Rieskamp, Jörg
Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Max Planck Society;

External Resource

No external resources are shared

Fulltext (restricted access)

There are currently no full texts shared for your IP range.

Fulltext (public)

There are no public fulltexts stored in PuRe

Supplementary Material (public)

There is no public supplementary material available

Citation

Rieskamp, J. (2000). Will we ever stop studying one-shot games? Fairness as an equilibrium selection device in an indefinite repeated bargaining experiment. In Proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Annual Conference of the International Association for Research in Economic Psychology, Vienna/Austria (pp. 375-381). Wien: WUV Facultas.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0025-9A01-E

Abstract

There is no abstract available