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Visions of rationality

MPS-Authors
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Hertwig,  Ralph
Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Max Planck Society;

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Gigerenzer,  Gerd
Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Max Planck Society;

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VC_Visions_1998.pdf
(Publisher version), 244KB

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Citation

Chase, V. M., Hertwig, R., & Gigerenzer, G. (1998). Visions of rationality. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2(6), 206-214.


Cite as: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0025-A085-F
Abstract
The classical view that equates rationality with adherence to the laws of probability theory and logic has driven much research on human inference. Recently, an increasing number of researchers have begun to espouse a view of rationality that takes account of organisms' adaptive goals, natural environment, and cognitive constraints. We argue that inference is carried out using boundedly rational heuristics, that is, heuristics that allow organisms to reach their goals under conditions of limited time, information, and computational capacity. These heuristics are ecologically rational in that they exploit aspects of both the physical and social environment in order to make fast and frugal inferences. We review recent work exploring this multifaceted conception of rationality.