A continuous evolutionary simulation model of the attainability of honest 
signalling equilibria

Bullock, Seth

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A continuous evolutionary simulation model of the attainability of honest signalling equilibria

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Bullock, Seth
Center for Adaptive Behavior and Cognition, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Max Planck Society;

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Bullock, S. (1998). A continuous evolutionary simulation model of the attainability of honest signalling equilibria. In C. Adami, R. K. Belew, & H. Kitano (Eds.), Artificial life VI: Proceedings of the Sixth International Conference on Artificial Life (pp. 339-348). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0025-A2CC-7

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