Deutsch
 
Hilfe Datenschutzhinweis Impressum
  DetailsucheBrowse

Datensatz

DATENSATZ AKTIONENEXPORT
Zur Ablage hinzufügen
  Lokale TagsFreigabegeschichteDetailsÜbersicht

Freigegeben
Forschungspapier

Third-Party Punishment: Retribution or Deterrence?

MPG-Autoren
/persons/resource/persons49219

Tan,  Fangfang
Public Economics, MPI for Tax Law and Public Finance, Max Planck Society;

Externe Ressourcen

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2425522
(Zusammenfassung)

Volltexte (beschränkter Zugriff)
Für Ihren IP-Bereich sind aktuell keine Volltexte freigegeben.
Volltexte (frei zugänglich)
Es sind keine frei zugänglichen Volltexte in PuRe verfügbar
Ergänzendes Material (frei zugänglich)
Es sind keine frei zugänglichen Ergänzenden Materialien verfügbar
Zitation

Tan, F., & Xiao, E. (2014). Third-Party Punishment: Retribution or Deterrence? Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, No. 2014-05.


Zitierlink: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0025-7749-F
Zusammenfassung
We conduct an experiment to examine the role of retribution and deterrence in motivating third party punishment. In particular, we consider how the role of these two motives may differ according to whether a third party is a group or an individual. In a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game with third party punishment, we find groups punish more when the penalty embeds deterrence than when it can only be retributive. In contrast, individual third parties’ punishment decisions do not vary on whether the punishment has any deterrent effect. In general, third party groups are less likely to impose punishment than individuals even though the punishment is costless for third parties.