Fairness and Persuasion: How Stakeholder Communication Affects Impartial 
Decision Making

Kleine, Marco; Langenbach, Pascal; Zhurakhovska, Lilia

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2016.02.019

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT

Add to Basket

Local TagsRelease HistoryDetailsSummary

Released

Journal Article

Fairness and Persuasion: How Stakeholder Communication Affects Impartial Decision Making

MPS-Authors

/persons/resource/persons145341

Kleine, Marco
MPI for Innovation and Competition, Max Planck Society;

External Resource

No external resources are shared

Fulltext (restricted access)

There are currently no full texts shared for your IP range.

Fulltext (public)

There are no public fulltexts stored in PuRe

Supplementary Material (public)

There is no public supplementary material available

Citation

Kleine, M., Langenbach, P., & Zhurakhovska, L. (2016). Fairness and Persuasion: How Stakeholder Communication Affects Impartial Decision Making. Economics Letters, 141, 173-176. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2016.02.019.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0025-77CB-D

Abstract

We study experimentally to what extent distributive fairness decisions by impartial authorities are influenced by stakeholders’ fairness opinions. In a three-player allocation game, we compare Communication treatments, in which one of the stakeholders states her opinion prior to the allocation decision, to a Baseline without communication. We find that stakeholders who state their opinion are allocated significantly less money than their counterparts in the Baseline. Asymmetric reactions to the statements appear to be the driving force behind this result: Authorities deviate from their initial fairness judgment and follow stakeholders’ opinions if the requests are moderate; they largely ignore high monetary requests.