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Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated Prisoner’s dilemma

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Hilbe,  Christian
Research Group Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society;

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Traulsen,  Arne
Department Evolutionary Theory, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, Max Planck Society;

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Citation

Hilbe, C., Traulsen, A., & Sigmund, K. (2015). Partners or rivals? Strategies for the iterated Prisoner’s dilemma. Games and economic behavior, 92, 41-52. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.005.


Cite as: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0027-8311-1
Abstract
Within the class of memory-one strategies for the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, we characterize partner strategies, competitive strategies and zero-determinant strategies. If a player uses a partner strategy, both players can fairly share the social optimum; but a co-player preferring an unfair solution will be penalized by obtaining a reduced payoff. A player using a competitive strategy never obtains less than the co-player. A player using a zero-determinant strategy unilaterally enforces a linear relation between the two players’ payoffs. These properties hold for every strategy used by the co-player, whether memory-one or not.