Eighteen-month-olds’ memory interference and distraction in a modified A-not-B 
task is not associated with their anticipatory looking in a false-belief task

Zmyj, Norbert; Prinz, Wolfgang; Daum, Moritz M.

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00857

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Eighteen-month-olds’ memory interference and distraction in a modified A-not-B task is not associated with their anticipatory looking in a false-belief task

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Prinz, Wolfgang
Department Psychology, MPI for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Max Planck Society;

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Zmyj, N., Prinz, W., & Daum, M. M. (2015). Eighteen-month-olds’ memory interference and distraction in a modified A-not-B task is not associated with their anticipatory looking in a false-belief task. Frontiers in Psychology, 6: 857. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00857.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0027-A6D6-9

Abstract

Infants’ performance in non-verbal false-belief tasks is often interpreted as if they have understood false beliefs. This view has been questioned by a recent account that explains infants’ performance in non-verbal false-belief tasks as the result of susceptibility to memory interference and distraction. We tested this alternative account by investigating the relationship between infants’ false-belief understanding, susceptibility to memory interference and distraction, and general cognitive development in 18-month-old infants (N = 22). False-belief understanding was tested in an anticipatory looking paradigm of a standard false-belief task. Susceptibility to memory interference and distraction was tested in a modified A-not-B task. Cognitive development was measured via the Mental Scale of the Bayley Scales of Infant Development. We did not find any relationship between infants’ performance in the false-belief task and the A-not-B task, even after controlling for cognitive development. This study shows that there is no ubiquitous relation between susceptibility to memory interference and distraction and performance in a false-belief task in infancy.