Formally Bounding the Side-Channel Leakage in Unknown-Message Attacks

Backes, Michael; Köpf, Boris

doi:10.1007/978-3-540-88313-5_33

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Formally Bounding the Side-Channel Leakage in Unknown-Message Attacks

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Backes, Michael
Group M. Backes, Max Planck Institute for Software Systems, Max Planck Society;

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Köpf, Boris
Group M. Backes, Max Planck Institute for Software Systems, Max Planck Society;

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Backes, M., & Köpf, B. (2008). Formally Bounding the Side-Channel Leakage in Unknown-Message Attacks. In S. Jajodia, & J. López (Eds.), Computer Security – ESORICS 2008: 13th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (pp. 517-532). Berlin: Springer.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-8C48-0

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