The behavioral logic of collective action: Partisans cooperate and punish more 
than nonpartisans

Smirnov, Oleg; Dawes, Christopher T.; Fowler, James H.; Johnson, Tim; McElreath, Richard

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2010.00768.x

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT

Add to Basket

Local TagsRelease HistoryDetailsSummary

Released

Journal Article

The behavioral logic of collective action: Partisans cooperate and punish more than nonpartisans

MPS-Authors

There are no MPG-Authors in the publication available

External Resource

No external resources are shared

Fulltext (restricted access)

There are currently no full texts shared for your IP range.

Fulltext (public)

There are no public fulltexts stored in PuRe

Supplementary Material (public)

There is no public supplementary material available

Citation

Smirnov, O., Dawes, C. T., Fowler, J. H., Johnson, T., & McElreath, R. (2010). The behavioral logic of collective action: Partisans cooperate and punish more than nonpartisans. Political Psychology, 31(4), 595-616. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2010.00768.x.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-4AFD-4

Abstract

There is no abstract available