Nebenwirkungen wirtschaftsrechtlicher Instrumente

Engel, Christoph; Engel, Christoph; Morlok, Martin

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Nebenwirkungen wirtschaftsrechtlicher Instrumente

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Engel, Christoph
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

/persons/resource/persons183106

Engel, Christoph
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

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引用

Engel, C. (1998). Nebenwirkungen wirtschaftsrechtlicher Instrumente. In C., Engel, & M., Morlok (Eds.), Öffentliches Recht als ein Gegenstand ökonomischer Forschung: die Begegnung der deutschen Staatsrechtslehre mit der konstitutionellen politischen Ökonomie (pp. 173-205). Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

引用: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-69A0-9

要旨

Side Effects of Tools Used in Economic Policy Public choice analysis interprets politicians and public officials as the self-interested agents of the public. Constitutional and administrative law are sometimes thought to be implicitly based on the assumption that policy-makers and public employees are benevolent. Both assumptions are obviously too strong. The paper strives for a more realistic, but sufficiently robust approach. It adds behavioural assumptions for firms and interest associations. It looks at possible safeguards. It uses these insights for comparing tools for solving public goods problems.