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Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem

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Hellwig,  Martin
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

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Hellwig, M., & Gale, D. (2003). Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem. In J. J. Laffont (Ed.), The principal agent mode. The eonomic theory of incentives (pp. 433-449). Cheltenham: Elgar.


Cite as: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6A5E-C
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