English
 
User Manual Privacy Policy Disclaimer Contact us
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT

Released

Paper

The Role of the Judiciary in the Public Decision Making Process

MPS-Authors
/persons/resource/persons183204

Sorge,  Marco M.
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

External Ressource
Fulltext (public)
There are no public fulltexts stored in PuRe
Supplementary Material (public)
There is no public supplementary material available
Citation

Albanese, G., & Sorge, M. M. (2010). The Role of the Judiciary in the Public Decision Making Process.


Cite as: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6C81-8
Abstract
In this paper we investigate the role of judicial control of lobbying activities in an endogenous policy framework, focusing on two dimensions of quality of the judiciary, namely efficiency and integrity. We present a multi-layer lobbying model where a self-interested group is allowed to inuence a public decision maker – and possibly the judicial authority itself, which performs an anti-corruption task – with the payment of illegal contributions, and provide general conditions for the existence of a zero-contribution equilibrium. Furthermore, we study how sensitive the main findings are to different institutional arrangements as to judicial independence.