English
 
Help Privacy Policy Disclaimer
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT

Released

Paper

Serial Dictatorship: the Unique Optimal Allocation Rule when Information is Endogenous

MPS-Authors
/persons/resource/persons183080

Bade,  Sophie
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

Fulltext (public)
There are no public fulltexts stored in PuRe
Supplementary Material (public)
There is no public supplementary material available
Citation

Bade, S. (2012). Serial Dictatorship: the Unique Optimal Allocation Rule when Information is Endogenous.


Cite as: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6C95-B
Abstract
The study of matching problems typically assumes that agents precisely know their preferences over the goods to be assigned. Within applied contexts, this assumption stands out as particularly counterfactual. Parents typically do invest a large amount of time and resources to find out which school would be best for their children, doctors run costly tests to establish which kidney might be best for a given patient. In this paper I introduce the assumption of endogenous information acquisition into otherwise standard house allocation problems. I find that there is a unique ex ante Pareto-optimal, strategy-proof and non-bossy allocation mechanism: serial dictatorship. This stands in sharp contrast to the very large set of such mechanisms for house allocation problems without endogenous information acquisition.