Cooperation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma Games

Beckenkamp, Martin; Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Maier-Rigaud, Frank P.

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Cooperation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma Games

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Beckenkamp, Martin
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

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Hennig-Schmidt, Heike
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

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Maier-Rigaud, Frank P.
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

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http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2006_25online.pdf
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Citation

Beckenkamp, M., Hennig-Schmidt, H., & Maier-Rigaud, F. P. (2006). Cooperation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma Games.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6CB5-5

Abstract

<p>We experimentally study the effect of asymmetry on cooperation in a 40 period prisoner's dilemma game in fixed partner design. We distinguish between a high and low payoff symmetric prisoner's dilemma and an asymmetric game combined out of both symmetric ones. Asymmetry significantly decreases cooperation, as low-type players are more likely to defect after mutual cooperation while high-type players initiate cooperation more often than the former. Asymmetry also has a significant negative effect on the stability of cooperation rendering long sequences of mutual cooperation extremely rare.</p>