English
 
Help Privacy Policy Disclaimer
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT

Released

Paper

Optimal Income Taxation, Public Goods Provision and Robust Mechanism Design

MPS-Authors
/persons/resource/persons183089

Bierbrauer,  Felix
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

Fulltext (public)
There are no public fulltexts stored in PuRe
Supplementary Material (public)
There is no public supplementary material available
Citation

Bierbrauer, F. (2008). Optimal Income Taxation, Public Goods Provision and Robust Mechanism Design.


Cite as: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6CC3-5
Abstract
This paper extends the model of optimal income taxation due to Mirrlees (1971) and includes private information on public goods preferences. A mechanism design approach is used to establish the following result: If policies are required to be robustly implementable in the sense of Bergemann and Morris (2005), then the optimality conditions in the extended model with uncertainty about tax and expenditure policies, are the same as in the standard model of optimal income taxation. The paper provides a foundation for a widely used assumption in public nance, namely that individuals optimize their behaviour subject to a predetermined and commonly known tax system.