Deutsch
 
Benutzerhandbuch Datenschutzhinweis Impressum Kontakt
  DetailsucheBrowse

Datensatz

DATENSATZ AKTIONENEXPORT

Freigegeben

Forschungspapier

Equilibrium Selection in Sequential Games with Imperfect Information

MPG-Autoren
/persons/resource/persons183162

Llorente-Saguer,  Aniol
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

Externe Ressourcen
Volltexte (frei zugänglich)
Es sind keine frei zugänglichen Volltexte verfügbar
Ergänzendes Material (frei zugänglich)
Es sind keine frei zugänglichen Ergänzenden Materialien verfügbar
Zitation

Eguia, J. X., Llorente-Saguer, A., Morton, R., & Nicolò, A. (2014). Equilibrium Selection in Sequential Games with Imperfect Information.


Zitierlink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6D25-0
Zusammenfassung
Games with imperfect information often feature multiple equilibria, which depend on beliefs off the equilibrium path. Standard selection criteria such as passive beliefs, symmetric beliefs or wary beliefs rest on ad hoc restrictions on beliefs. We propose a new selection criterion that imposes no restrictions on beliefs: we select the action profi…le that is supported in equilibrium by the largest set of beliefs. We conduct experiments to test the predictive power of the existing and our novel selection criteria in two applications: a game of vertical multi-lateral contracting, and a game of electoral competition. We fi…nd that our selection criterion outperforms the other selection criteria.