Deutsch
 
Benutzerhandbuch Datenschutzhinweis Impressum Kontakt
  DetailsucheBrowse

Datensatz

DATENSATZ AKTIONENEXPORT

Freigegeben

Forschungspapier

Can we manage first impressions in cooperation problems? An experiment

MPG-Autoren
/persons/resource/persons183106

Engel,  Christoph
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

/persons/resource/persons183150

Kube,  Sebastian
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

/persons/resource/persons183153

Kurschilgen,  Michael
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

Externe Ressourcen
Volltexte (frei zugänglich)
Es sind keine frei zugänglichen Volltexte verfügbar
Ergänzendes Material (frei zugänglich)
Es sind keine frei zugänglichen Ergänzenden Materialien verfügbar
Zitation

Engel, C., Kube, S., & Kurschilgen, M. (2011). Can we manage first impressions in cooperation problems? An experiment.


Zitierlink: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6DC8-4
Zusammenfassung
We study how cooperative behavior reacts to selective (favorable or unfavorable) pre-play information about the cooperativeness of other, unrelated groups within an experimental framework that is sufficiently rich for conflicting behavioral norms to emerge. We find that cooperation crucially depends on pre-play information, coinciding with a change in initial beliefs. Over time, behavior within both types of groups becomes increasingly homogeneous, indicating the formation of two rather different social norms, depending on whether pre-play information was favorable or unfavorable. In addition, we find unfavorable information to substantially reduce the effectiveness of peer punishment. For these differences to emerge it is immaterial whether each member or only one member of a four-person group receives the pre-play information.