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Delayed Verification Mechanism for Dynamic Implementation

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Gorelkina,  Olga
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

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Citation

Gorelkina, O. (2014). Delayed Verification Mechanism for Dynamic Implementation.


Cite as: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6E36-6
Abstract
This paper introduces a virtually efficient mechanism in a setting with sequentially arriving agents who hold informative signals about future types. To reveal the information the principal organises betting on future type reports. An agent’s betting reward depends on how accurately the prior updated on his report predicts the type reports observed in the following period. The mechanism satisfies participation constraints and generates no deficit after any reported history.