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Bidder Collusion and the Auction with Target Bids

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Gorelkina,  Olga
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

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Citation

Gorelkina, O. (2014). Bidder Collusion and the Auction with Target Bids.


Cite as: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6E38-2
Abstract
This paper studies collusion in one-shot auctions, where a buyer can bribe his competitors into lowering their bids. We modify the single-unit Vickrey auction to incite deviations from the designated-winner scenario and thus undermine collusion. The construction of mechanism does not require the knowledge of colluders’ identities or distributions of valuations, in which sense it is entirely detail-free.