English
 
Help Privacy Policy Disclaimer
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT

Released

Paper

Prices versus Quantities in Electricity Generation

MPS-Authors
/persons/resource/persons183126

Hahmeier,  Mark
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

Fulltext (restricted access)
There are currently no full texts shared for your IP range.
Fulltext (public)
There are no public fulltexts stored in PuRe
Supplementary Material (public)
There is no public supplementary material available
Citation

Hahmeier, M. (2009). Prices versus Quantities in Electricity Generation.


Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6E48-D
Abstract
This paper examines the prices versus quantities issue, originally raised by Weitzman [8], in the context of carbon dioxide emissions and with a special focus on electricity generation. Within a simpli ed model of the electricity market, in which we explicitly allow for a monopolistic gas supplier, we employ a game-theoretic approach and ask, from a welfare perspective, for the superior regulatory regime in response to an expected exercise of market power. Our analysis studies the optimal regulation in each regime and shows that, in the presence of market power in the gas market, taxes rather than permits are the regulator's welfare-maximizing regime choice.