English
 
User Manual Privacy Policy Disclaimer Contact us
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT

Released

Paper

Netting of capacity in interconnector auctions

MPS-Authors
/persons/resource/persons183135

Höffler,  Felix
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

External Ressource
Fulltext (public)
There are no public fulltexts stored in PuRe
Supplementary Material (public)
There is no public supplementary material available
Citation

Höffler, F., & Wittmann, T. (2006). Netting of capacity in interconnector auctions.


Cite as: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6EC0-0
Abstract
Scarce interconnector capacities are a severe obstacle to transregional competition and a unified market for electricity in the European Union. However, physically the interconnectors are rarely used up to capacity. This is due to the fact that the current allocation schemes make only limited use of the fact that currents in opposing directions cancel out. We propose a "netting" auction mechanism which makes use of this and in which even small transmission capacities can generate large competitive pressure in adjacent markets. Netting increases the usage of capacity and reduces the auctioneer's incentive to withhold capacity from the auction.