Aggregation Technology of Common Goods and its Strategic Consequences: Global 
Warming, Biodiversity, and Siting Conflicts

Holzinger, Katharina

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT

Add to Basket

Local TagsRelease HistoryDetailsSummary

Released

Paper

Aggregation Technology of Common Goods and its Strategic Consequences: Global Warming, Biodiversity, and Siting Conflicts

MPS-Authors

/persons/resource/persons183136

Holzinger, Katharina
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

External Resource

http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2000_08online.pdf
(Preprint)

Fulltext (restricted access)

There are currently no full texts shared for your IP range.

Fulltext (public)

There are no public fulltexts stored in PuRe

Supplementary Material (public)

There is no public supplementary material available

Citation

Holzinger, K. (2000). Aggregation Technology of Common Goods and its Strategic Consequences: Global Warming, Biodiversity, and Siting Conflicts.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6EC6-4

Abstract

The analysis of common goods needs to look very carefully at the characteristics of the goods and of the social situations of their provision. Different characteristics lead to different strategic constellations and therefore to different opportunities for institutional solutions to the problems of provision. Basic differences in strategic constellations can be shown clearly by employing matrix games. In this paper a particular attribute of common goods, their aggregation technology, is systematically analyzed. Variations in this dimension are exemplified by three cases from environmental policy: global warming, biodiversity, and siting conflicts. It becomes clear that the analysis of one specific attribute of a good will seldom suffice to predict empirical behavior. Nevertheless, rigorous game theoretic analysis provides valuable insights into the links between the characteristics of common goods and the need for institutions