On Competition and the Strategic Management of Intellectual Property in 
Oligopoly

Jansen, Jos

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT

Add to Basket

Local TagsRelease HistoryDetailsSummary

Released

Paper

On Competition and the Strategic Management of Intellectual Property in Oligopoly

MPS-Authors

/persons/resource/persons183139

Jansen, Jos
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

External Resource

http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2009_13online.pdf
(Preprint)

Fulltext (restricted access)

There are currently no full texts shared for your IP range.

Fulltext (public)

There are no public fulltexts stored in PuRe

Supplementary Material (public)

There is no public supplementary material available

Citation

Jansen, J. (2009). On Competition and the Strategic Management of Intellectual Property in Oligopoly.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6ED4-4

Abstract

An innovative firm chooses strategically whether to patent its process innovation or rely on secrecy. By doing so, the firm manages its rival’s beliefs about the size of the innovation, and affects the incentives in the product market. Different measures of competitive pressure in the product market have different effects on the equilibrium patenting choices of an innovative firm with unknown costs and probabilistic patent validity. Increasing the number of firms (degree of product substitutability) gives a smaller (greater) patenting incentive. Switching from Bertrand to Cournot competition gives a smaller (greater) patenting incentive if patent protection is weak (strong).