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The Role of Choice in Social Dilemma Experiments

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Maier-Rigaud,  Frank P.
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

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Citation

Maier-Rigaud, F. P., & Apesteguia, J. (2003). The Role of Choice in Social Dilemma Experiments.


Cite as: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6F38-9
Abstract
On the basis of problems related to asymmetric information, self-governance has been proposed and often empirically found to be superior to the external imposition of rules in social dilemma situations. The present paper suggests and experimentally analyses a different line of argument, namely to what extent behavioral aspects can explain these findings. We study this hypothesis using the simplest, most general dilemma form: the prisoner's dilemma (PD). We compare behavior when players are given the possibility of choosing between two different representations of the same PD, to behavior when players are externally assigned to play a specific game. We find that cooperation rates are significantly higher in the games that were chosen.