English
 
User Manual Privacy Policy Disclaimer Contact us
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT

Released

Paper

Entry and Incumbent Innovation

MPS-Authors
/persons/resource/persons183220

Weinschenk,  Philipp
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

External Ressource
Fulltext (public)
There are no public fulltexts stored in PuRe
Supplementary Material (public)
There is no public supplementary material available
Citation

Weinschenk, P. (2010). Entry and Incumbent Innovation.


Cite as: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6FD4-B
Abstract
We explore how the threat of entry influences the innovation activity of an incumbent. We show that the incumbent’s investment is hump-shaped in the entry threat. When the entry threat is small and increases, the incumbent invests more to deter entry, or to make it unlikely. This is due to the entry deterrence effect. However, when the threat becomes huge, entry can no longer profitably be deterred or made unlikely and the investment becomes small. Then the Schumpeterian effect dominates. These results turn out to be very robust.