English
 
Help Privacy Policy Disclaimer
  Advanced SearchBrowse

Item

ITEM ACTIONSEXPORT

Released

Paper

Strategic Trustworthiness via Non-Strategic Third-Party Reward – An Experiment

MPS-Authors
/persons/resource/persons183223

Zhurakhovska,  Lilia
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

Fulltext (restricted access)
There are currently no full texts shared for your IP range.
Fulltext (public)
There are no public fulltexts stored in PuRe
Supplementary Material (public)
There is no public supplementary material available
Citation

Zhurakhovska, L. (2014). Strategic Trustworthiness via Non-Strategic Third-Party Reward – An Experiment.


Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-6FDE-8
Abstract
In modern societies more and more people interact with strangers in one-shot situations. In these situations it might be difficult to trust others. Yet, trust is an essential component of most economic interactions. In this paper (in a one-shot situation) an impartial third party can reward another stranger for being trustworthy towards another unrelated person. By design the reward is costly and cannot be strategically motivated. Subjects strategically increase their trustworthiness towards others if they can anticipate to be rewarded for such behavior by an impartial third party. Impartial third parties reward trustworthiness irrespective of whether it can be anticipated.