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Leading with(out) Sacrifice? A Public-Goods Experiment with a Super Privileged Player

MPS-Authors
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Glöckner,  Andreas
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

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Irlenbusch,  Bernd
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

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Kube,  Sebastian
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

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Nicklisch,  Andreas
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

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Normann,  Hans-Theo
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

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Citation

Glöckner, A., Irlenbusch, B., Kube, S., Nicklisch, A., & Normann, H.-T. (2011). Leading with(out) Sacrifice? A Public-Goods Experiment with a Super Privileged Player. Economic Inquiry, 49, 591-597.


Cite as: http://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-725C-2
Abstract
We analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong player.