The Marginal Incentive of Insider Trading: An Economic Reinterpretation of the 
Case Law

Grechenig, Kristoffel

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The Marginal Incentive of Insider Trading: An Economic Reinterpretation of the Case Law

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Grechenig, Kristoffel
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

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Grechenig, K. (2006). The Marginal Incentive of Insider Trading: An Economic Reinterpretation of the Case Law. University of Memphis Law Review, 37, 75-148.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-7286-2

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