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Journal Article

No derivative shareholder suits in Europe: A model of percentage limits and collusion

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Grechenig,  Kristoffel
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

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Grechenig, K., & Sekyra, M. (2011). No derivative shareholder suits in Europe: A model of percentage limits and collusion. International Review of Law and Economics (IRLE), 31, 16-20.


Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-72A0-6
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