Fooling the nice guys: Explaining receiver credulity in a public good game with 
lying and punishment

Irlenbusch, Bernd; Ter Meer, Janna

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Fooling the nice guys: Explaining receiver credulity in a public good game with lying and punishment

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Irlenbusch, Bernd
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

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Irlenbusch, B., & Ter Meer, J. (2013). Fooling the nice guys: Explaining receiver credulity in a public good game with lying and punishment. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 93, 321-327.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-0028-7420-1

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