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Paper

Communication and voting in heterogeneous committees: An experimental study

MPS-Authors

Marcin,  Isabel
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

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http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2016_05online.pdf
(Preprint)

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Citation

Le Quement, M. T., & Marcin, I. (2016). Communication and voting in heterogeneous committees: An experimental study.


Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002A-14AB-F
Abstract
We study experimentally the effectiveness of communication in common value committees exhibiting publicly known heterogeneous biases. We test models assuming respectively self-interested and strategic-, joint payoff-maximizing- and cognitively heterogeneous agents. These predict varying degrees of strategic communication. We use a 2 x 2 design varying the information protocol (communication vs exogenous public signals) and the group composition (heterogeneous vs homogeneous). Results are only consistent with the third model. Roughly 80% of (heuristic) subjects truth-tell and vote with the majority of announced signals. Remaining (sophisticated) agents lie strategically and approximately apply their optimal decision rule.