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Journal Article

Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems

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Bade,  Sophie
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Max Planck Society;

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http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053116300321
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Citation

Bade, S. (2016). Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems. Journal of Economic Theory, 165, 257-262.


Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002A-AD31-0
Abstract
No group-strategyproof and ex-post Pareto optimal random matching mechanism treats equals equally. Every mechanism that arises out of the randomization over a set of non-bossy and strategyproof mechanisms is non-bossy. Random serial dictatorship, which arises out of a randomization over all deterministic serial dictatorships is non-bossy but not group-strategyproof.