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Contribution to Collected Edition

Control Mechanisms for CRM Systems and Competition Law


Hilty,  Reto M.
MPI for Innovation and Competition, Max Planck Society;


Li,  Tao
MPI for Innovation and Competition, Max Planck Society;

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Hilty, R. M., & Li, T. (2017). Control Mechanisms for CRM Systems and Competition Law. In K.-C. Liu, & R. M. Hilty (Eds.), Remuneration of Copyright Owners - Regulatory Challenges of New Business Models (pp. 157-176). Berlin; Heidelberg: Springer.

Cite as: https://hdl.handle.net/11858/00-001M-0000-002A-BD3C-A
There are basically two different mechanisms to control collective management organizations (CMOs), namely the general competition-law approach and the sector-specific regulation approach. This chapter explains the features of copyright management (CRM) systems in general and discusses up- and downsides of both approaches. In conclusion it suggests a primary focus on sector-specific regulation. This approach not only takes into account the particularities of two-sided markets in which CMOs act as intermediaries, but also allows the balancing of non-economic values and interests which are among the objectives of CMOs. Sector-specific regulation is further capable of addressing governance issues of CMOs; above all, it promotes transparency for both right holders and users by providing ex ante guidance. General competition law, in contrast, applies ex post and is particularly likely to become a last resort to control CMOs.